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THE LAW OF FIXTURES AS AFFECTED BY THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE LITIGANTS
A fixture is generally defined as a chattel which has by annexation
to real estate become a part of such real estate in legal contemplation.
Such a general definition, obviously, is of little value to the practitioner
who is faced with the problem of determining whether a particular
chattel has or has not become a fixture, since it leaves unanswered the
vital question of whether "affixation" has taken place.
Three general, standardized tests have been invoked by the courts
in determining whether affixation has occurred. These tests, almost
universally employed in the several states, are set forth in the Wisconsin case of Standard Oil v. La Crosse Super Auto Service,' and
are enumerated therein as: (1) actual physical annexation to the real
estate. (2) application or adaptation to the use or purpose to which
the realty is devoted. (3) an intention by the person making the annexation to make the chattel a permanent addition to the real estate.
It is the purpose of this note to illustrate the application of these
tests by the courts to the relationships of landlord and tenant, conditional vendor and prior mortgagee of the land, conditional vendor and
subsequent mortgagee of the land, and in taxation proceedings. In
these relationships the query, "chattel or fixture?" is of vital importance to the parties.
LANDLORD V. TENANT

In disputes between landlord and tenant or those claiming under
them the intention of the parties is given primary consideration, and
the
often controls. Thus, in Old Line Life Insurance Co. v. Hazwnu
court held that in the absence of any express stipulation to the contrary chattels installed by the tenant might be removed at the expiration of the lease. The tenant had placed stanchions, a hay carrier,
drinking cups and pipes in the barn; had erected a tool shed and a
brooder house on -the land, and installed a pipeless furnace in the
house. The mortgagee of the realty sought to halt removal of these
articles, claiming that they were fixtures. The lower court sustained
his contention. But on appeal all of the articles, even the pipeless
furnace, were held to be the tenant's "trade fixtures", i.e., not fixtures
at all in the legal sense, but chattels." A dissenting opinion objected
only to the inclusion of the pipeless furnace among the articles which
'1217 Wis. 327, 258 N.W. 791 (1935).
2225 Wis. 627, 275 N.W. 542 (1937).
sTo constitute any chattel that has been attached to the freehold a trade fixture, it is necessary that it be devoted to what is known in the law of fixtures
as a trade purpose. Waverly Park Amusement Co. v. Michigan United Traction Co., 197 Mich. 92, 163 N.W. 917 (1917). Thus trade fixtures would be
those adaptable only to the peculiar type of trade in which its installer engaged
and not to general business purposes.
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could be removed, since such removal injured the premises. But the
majority held the trade fixture theory applicable to all chattels installed
by a farm tenant, because of his presumed intention not to make such
chattels a part of the realty.
In Standard Oil Co. v. La Crosse Super Auto Service4 the court
said that intention5 was becoming the primary test, especially where
trade fixtures were involved. In that case the only items involved
were gasoline pumps installed on a concrete base and gasoline tanks
placed underground beneath the concrete drive of the station. The
Standard Oil Company had reserved in the lease the right to remove
equipment within a thirty day period following termination of the
lease. Removal was objected to on the grounds that the annexation of
the chattels had made them a part of the reality. The finding of the
lower court, allowing removal by the tenant, was affirmed on appeal.
When the tenant annexes a chattel, expresses his intention that it
is not to become a fixture, and the landlord assents, such expressed
intention controls. But when there is no intention expressed it must
be gathered from all of the circumstances, and the factors of physical
annexation to the land and the adaptability to the use of the land,
given as separate criteria in the Wisconsin case, become in fact a part
of the circumstances from which the intention of the annexing party
must be determined. Accordingly, such physical annexation that removal will cause serious injury to the premises may become a controlling factor in determining whether a chattel has become a fixture.
Thus, in Northwestern Loan & Trust Co. v. Topp Oil & Supply Co."
the removal of a filling station building and its equipment was denied
the tenant who had annexed them to the land. The court found that
the property could not easily be restored to its original condition, especially in view of the fact that a house had been razed to make room
for the filling station.
In some landlord and tenant cases involving fixtures, statutes may
change the usual application of the law of fixtures. The case of Story
Gold Dredging Co. v. Wilson7 held that a dredge placed on leased
mining property for the mining of placer gold was not a trade fixture,
as the tenant pleaded, but rather a part of the realty. The statute pro4217 Wis. 237, 258 N.W. 791 (1935).
5Intention of the parties is determined either from expressed intention as
found in documents such as chattel mortgages, and conditional sales agree-

ments; or from the circumstances of the affair. The actions of the parties
will be used in determination of intention as will various facts concerning the
fixture itself. Express intention may be shown by written reservations or by
stipulations in leases as to whether a chattel is to remain such or become a

part of the realty. Where the parties assert conflicting intentions external and
visible facts will determine.
I211 Wis. 489, 248 N.W. 466 (1933).
7

(Montana 1938) 76 P. (2d) 73.
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vided that sluiceboxes, flumes, hose, pipes, railway tracks, blacksmith
shops, mills and all other machinery or tools used in developing or
working a mine were to be deemed affixed to the mine.,
CONDITIONAL VENDOR V. PRIOR MORTGAGEE

Disputes between conditional vendors and mortgagees require for
their determination, besides the three standard tests for fixtures, a
consideration of whether the chattel was relied on by the mortgagee
as constituting a part of the security and the possibility of impairing
the security or injuring the freehold by removal of the alleged fixture.
In Vorclone Corp. v. Larsoni the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
a conditional sales contract executed after the buyer had given a mortgage on the realty to which the goods were affixed was valid as against
the mortgagee, even though not filed in accordance with Wisconsin
statute,'" since the chattel, a piece of laundry machinery, was not relied
upon by the mortgagee as a part of the security. Moreover, it was
readily removable from the premises and the mortgagee had notice of
the vendor's claim at the time of sale and before the installation of the
machinery.
In Wisconsin, it is of considerable importance whether the chattel
is severable without material injury to the freehold or not. People's
Savings & Trust Co. v. Munsert" held that equipment installed in a
factory under a conditional sales agreement was removable without
material injury to the freehold and thus the rights of the vendor were
superior to those of a prior mortgagee. The equipment included an
automatic fire extinguishing system, a veneer dryer and a veneer
jointer. The first sentence of section seven of Chapter 122 of the Wisconsin Statutes' 2 was held to apply in this instance. Thus, the
8 Montana Revised Statutes § 6670.
e217 Wis. 214, 257 N.W. 611 (1935).
WIs. STAT. (1937) § 122.07.
= 212 Wis. 449, 250 N.W.385 (1933).
§ 122.07. "If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time
= Wis. STAT. (1937)
t0

of a conditional sale or subsequently as to become a part thereof and not to
be severable wholly or in any portion without material injury to the freehold,
the reservation of property as to any portion not so severable shall be void
after the goods are so affixed, as against any person who has not expressly
assented to the reservation. If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time
a conditional sale or subsequently as to become part thereof but to be severable without material injury to the freehold, the reservation of property shall
be void after the goods are so affixed as against subsequent purchasers of the
realty for value and without notice of the conditional seller's title, unless the
conditional sale contract, or a copy thereof together with a statement signed
by the seller, briefly describing the realty and stating that the goods are or
to be affixed thereto, shall be filed before such purchase in the office of the
register of deeds of the county where such realty is located and also entered
in the tract index, when kept. As against the owner of realty the reservation
of the property in goods by a conditional seller shall be void when such goods
are to be so affixed to the realty as to become part thereof, but to be severable
without material injury to the freehold, unless the conditional sale contract,
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law of conditional sales and not of fixtures applied. Reservation of a

property interest m the chattel by a conditional vendor, if the property
is not severable without material injury to the freehold is allowed if
all parties concerned agree to such reservation. Where the purchaser
of the chattel is also owner of the realty, Section 122.07 is inapplicable.
The doctrine that a chattel which may be removed without material injury to the premises, is not a fixture, was upheld in Provident
Building & Loan Ass'n. of Passaic County v. William Day Sons Realty
Co." In that case a boiler had been placed in a building, having been
brought in through already existing doors. It was claimed that the
boiler constituted a part of the premises, so as to be subject to a prior
mortgage on the realty. The plaintiff's mortgage had been executed
prior to the installation of the boiler, eliminating a plea of estoppel
based on the mortgagee's reliance on the boiler as security for the
loan. All that had to be done, outside of a few slight operations, such
as removing connections, was to move the boiler through the door.
The conditional vendor prevailed here, as no material injury resulted
from removal of the chattel1 4
In Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Savings & Loan Co.,15 mere
attachment of a furnace by means of metallic sleeves was sufficient to
make a fixture of the furnace, together with the fact that a heating
plant was necessary to the utility of the house as well as the fact that
mere filing of the conditional sales contract was not constructive notice
to the mortgagee. The mortgagee was never informed of the fact that
the furnace was installed in place of an old one and prevailed against
the efforts of the furnace company to gain possession of the furnace
upon foreclosure of the realty mortgage.
Bowling alleys requiring special foundations or special buildings
are usually held to be so annexed to the freehold that a material injury
would result to the premises by their removal. This doctrine has been
applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case of BrunsunckBalke-Collender Co. v. Franzke-Schffman Realty Co.", In that case
the court held that since a building was erected specially to accommodate the alleys, and since special foundations were required, material
or a copy thereof, together with a statement signed by the seller briefly
describing the realty and stating that the goods are to be affixed thereto,
shall be filed before they are affixed, in the office of the register of deeds of
the county where such realty is located, and also entered in the tract index,

when kept."
- 122 N. J.E. 326, 194 At. 53 (1937).
Cf. Omaha Loan & Building Assn. v. Bigelow, 133 Neb. 275, 274 N.W. 574
(1937), where a gas furnace was allowed to be removed by a conditional vendor because removal entailed no material injury to the premises.
iS (Ohio 1939) 19 N.E. (2d) 273.
16124 Conn. 59, 198 Atl. 252 (1938).
27 211 Wis. 659, 248 N.W 178 (1933).
24
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injury would be done to the freehold by the removal of the alleys.
Thus they were held a part of the realty and the seller's reservation
of title under the Wisconsin statutes was void as against the mortgagee who had not consented to such reservation.
CONDITIONAL VENDOR V. SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGEE

When a chattel is purchased on conditional sale and then attached
to realty, the purchaser impliedly agrees that as between the parties
to the sale the goods shall retain their personal character at least until
paid for. Such agreement is upheld by the courts unless the affixation
to the land is such as to cause the chattels to lose completely their
character of personal property, e.g., where lumber becomes part of a
building.
If a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the land buys with
notice of the rights of the conditional vendor or prior mortgagee of a
chattel which has been annexed to the land, the rights of the conditional vendor or prior mortgagee take precedences Some jurisdictions
hold that constructive notice is given to a subsequent mortgagee by the
filing of the conditional sale contract or the chattel mortgage. Other
jurisdictions hold that it is too much to expect the purchaser of the
realty to search personal property records to ascertain if some
encumbranced personal property has been affixed to the realty concerned.2 ' In such jurisdictions constructive notice can be given only
by recording the conditional sale or the chattel mortgage in the register
provided for the recording of encumbrances on realty The Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, which has been enacted in Wisconsin, requires
such recording to give the conditional vendor of a chattel a lien superior
to that of a subsequent mortgage of the land to which the chattel has
been annexed.Y
In all of the cases involving disputes between conditional vendors
of chattels and mortgagees of the land to which such chattels have been
annexed the courts give primary consideration to the natural equities
between the parties. The other factors in determining whether a chattel has become a fixture, to wit, annexation, adaptation and intention,
are given secondary consideration.
STATE V. TAXPAYER

When the problem is whether a certain article shall be taxed as
realty or personalty there are obviously no equities between parties
to be considered. Even the intention of the person annexing the
Wis. STAT. (1937) § 122.07
19Warer v. Kenning, 25 Minn. 173 (1879).
20 Monarch Laundry Co. v. Westbrook, 109 Va. 382, 63 S.E. 1070 (1909).
21
23

22

Tibbetts v. Home, 65 N.H. 242, 23 Atl. 145 (1889).
Wis. STAT. (1937) § 133.07, Cf. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. FranzkeSchiffman Realty Co., 211 Wis. 659, 248 N.W 178 (1933).
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chattel to the land becomes important chiefly in so far as that intention
must be presumed in view of the manner in which the chattel has
been attached and its adaptation for use in combination with the land.
s
In Southern California Tel. Co. v. State Board of Equalization~
an attempt was made by a telephone company to set aside the State
Board of Equalization's assessment of central office equipment as improvements to the realty The company claimed that the equipment
was personalty. Adaptation, plus the fact that the central exchange
building was expressly designed and built for telephone purposes,
caused the court to hold the equipment of the central offices a part
of the realty. However, small switchboards placed in small leased
offices in smaller towns were by their nature held to be personalty
even though attached to the floor or walls by screws or bolts.
The intent of the legislature rather than that of the annexor may
be decisive when the interpretation of a tax statute is involved. This
was illustrated in a case involving the taxation of water pipes, which
at common law were regarded as part of the realty for tax purposes.
A statute had enumerated items to be taxed as personal property. Gas
and water pipes were omitted. This omission was construed as an
expression of legislative intent that such pipes were to be treated as
realty.?4
Obviously, there is always a statute at the root of every taxation
problem, but often the statute is too general to furnish a standard for
the solution of a specific problem. In Town of Langdale v. Crocker
Chair Co.25 a logging railroad constructed with leased rails on the taxpayer's land was levied upon as personal property. This was improper,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held, under a statute which provided
that "buildings and improvements on leased land" were to be taxed
as realty. The decision in terms was based on legislative intent, and
was undoubtedly correct. But it implied rather than stated that "improvements" meant "fixtures" and that a railroad track is a fixture
inasmuch as it is peculiarly adapted for use in combination with the
land on which the rails are laid, and possesses no functional use except
in such combination.
Although a chattel may clearly become a fixture at the moment of
annexation, it still may be taxed as personalty during the interval, however short, between purchase and annexation. Thus, in Fifteenth Street
Investment Co. v. People6 materials used in the construction of elevators were held taxable under a use tax statute on personal property,
although the elevators after installation were considered as a part of
the realty.
CARL A. LUTHER.
- (Cal. 1938) 82 P
133 S.C. 383, 131
190 Wis. 226, 208
26 (Col. 1938) 81 P
25

(2d) 422.
S.E. 37 (1925).

N.W 799 (1926).
(2d) 764.

